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Abstract
Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of puerperal fever around the mid-
dle of the 19th century counts among the paradigm cases of scientific discov-
ery. For several decades, philosophers of science have used the episode to
illustrate, appraise and compare views of proper scientific methodology.
Here I argue that the episode can be profitably reexamined in light of
two cognate notions: causal reasoning and mechanisms. Semmelweis used
several causal reasoning strategies both to support his own and to reject com-
peting hypotheses. However, these strategies have gone unappreciated in the
existing literature. I show that a causal reasoning approach makes sense of
the multitude of tables in Semmelweis’s main text, which in later editions
were often abridged because they appeared redundant.
Moreoever, the existing literature tends to focus on Semmelweis’s clini-
cal intervention and on the extent to which it alone confirms his theoretical
conclusions. This neglects Semmelweis’s efforts to show by animal experi-
ments that his clinical results are in agreement with a demonstrable mecha-
nism of puerperal fever pathogenesis. I argue that the full evidential force of
Semmelweis’s argument can only be appreciated if both his clinical and his
laboratory investigations are taken into account.
1 Introduction
Ignaz Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of childbed (or puerperal) fever in the
middle of the 19th century has come to play a double role in the history and philos-
ophy of science. On the one hand, the episode is of intrinsic interest to historians
of science and medicine because it contributed to a major transformation of our
understanding of infectious diseases and their management. On the other hand, in
philosophy of science the episode has assumed broader relevance due to its use as a
case study of scientific discovery and confirmation. Philosophers have referred to it
for decades in order to illustrate, appraise and compare methodological proposals.
The medical historian Erna Lesky (1964) already discussed aspects of Sem-
melweis’s methodology at some length in the broader context of the Vienna Med-
ical School of the 19th century. But Semmelweis’s career as a methodological
case study began in earnest with Carl G. Hempel’s Philosophy of Natural Science
(1966), in which Hempel used the Semmelweis case as a “simple illustration” of
the hypothetico-deductive method.1 Only recently, Donald Gillies (2005) added
1Hempel (1966), pp. 3–18.
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a Kuhnian perspective to the Hempelian reconstruction. Among the most promi-
nent critiques of the hypothetico-deductive account is Peter Lipton’s seminal Infer-
ence to the Best Explanation (2004). Lipton argued for the superior philosophical
virtues of inference to the best explanation explicitly by contrasting his account
of the Semmelweis case with Hempel’s.2 Current proponents of inference to the
best explanation still use the Semmelweis case by way of illustration and argu-
ment. For instance, Alexander Bird (2010) has argued that the case constitutes a
particular subtype of inference to the best explanation which he calls “inference to
the only explanation”, or “Holmesian induction”. It speaks to the importance of
the Semmelweis case in philosophy that the most widely used English translation
of Semmelweis’s main work, The Etiology, Concept, and Prophylaxis of Childbed
Fever (originally published in 1861), was edited not by a historian, but by the
philosopher K. Codell Carter.3 Among Carter’s motivations for producing a new
translation was his need of an accessible, yet substantial historical case study in
a course in history and philosophy of science.4 It is thus no exaggeration to say
that Semmelweis’s work has become a paradigm case of scientific discovery and
confirmation within philosophy of science.
In the present paper I am putting forward a new account of Semmelweis’s
methodology based on the cognate notions of causal reasoning and mechanisms.
First, I will argue that Semmelweis’s work can be reconstructed straightforwardly
as a series of causal inferences along the lines of Mill’s four methods (see sec-
tion 2). Semmelweis’s causal reasoning strategies have so far not been recognized
as a coherent whole. I will argue that a major reason for this neglect is that Sem-
melweis’s presentation in the Etiology relies heavily on numerical tables, which
have traditionally received little notice except for their number and apparent re-
dundancy. Many editions – including Carter’s translation – omit most of the tables.
Next, I will argue that the philosophical discussion has been too narrowly fo-
cused on Semmelweis’s clinical investigations and on the extent to which they
alone confirmed his causal hypothesis (section 3). A reconsideration of the earliest
published accounts of the discovery, as well as of Semmelweis’s main work, sug-
gests that the actual historical debate placed considerable importance on demon-
2Lipton (2004), pp. 74–90; first edition in 1991.
3In the present paper, references to Semmelweis’s Etiology will be given for two editions: The
original German edition (Semmelweis, 1861) and the English translation by K. Codell Carter (Sem-
melweis, 1983).
4See the translator’s preface in Semmelweis (1983), p. ix.
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strating by animal experiments that Semmelweis’s causal hypothesis was mecha-
nistically plausible.
2 A causal inference account of Semmelweis’s work
As a framework for reconstructing Semmelweis’s causal inferences, I am going to
use John Stuart Mill’s four methods of experimental inquiry.5 The appeal of Mill’s
methods is that they are roughly contemporaneous with Semmelweis’s investiga-
tions. Thus, an analysis of Semmelweis’s work in terms of Mill’s methods can be
carried out free of the charge of anachronism.
However, two caveats are in order, one historical and the other philosophical.
First, on the historical side, I am not suggesting that Semmelweis was directly in-
fluenced by Mill. My two claims are (1) that Mill successfully outlined at least
some methods of causal reasoning that were used in 19th century empirical sci-
ence, and (2) that Semmelweis used the same or similar methods. Where Sem-
melweis learned such methods is a different question. Erna Lesky traced Semmel-
weis’s methodological influences through his teacher and supporter Joseph Skoda
to the “numerical method” as advocated by the Parisian clinicians Pierre-Charles-
Alexandre Louis and, later, Gabriel Andral.6 This is certainly plausible, although
more recent work shows that the use of numerical methods was widespread in the
early 19th century even before the Parisian pioneers, especially in Great Britain.7
For our present purposes, we can leave the question of intellectual influences aside.
Thus, when I speak of Semmelweis using “Mill’s methods”, the claim is not of his-
torical influence but of methodological affinity.
Second, on the philosophical side, I am not offering Mill’s methods as a com-
plete and workable apparatus for causal inference. Nor am I suggesting that an
appropriately sophisticated modern theory of causal inference should replace all
other approaches in confirmation theory. Hempel and Lipton proposed their recon-
structions of Semmelweis’s work as potential exemplars for all confirmation in sci-
ence. My argument is initially local and historical: I will show that Semmelweis’s
methodology is best construed along the lines of Mill’s methods. A discussion of
5Mill (1843), III.VIII.
6The claim is in Lesky (1964), p. 60. See also Roy Porter (1999), ch. 11, for an historical
overview of the period, and Terence D. Murphy (1981) for a more extended discussion of numerical
methods in early 19th century France.
7See Tröhler (2000).
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the relationship between Mill’s methods and an overall theory of confirmation must
be deferred to another occasion.
Let us now turn to the core historical argument. Among Mill’s methods of
causal inquiry are the method of agreement, the method of concomitant variation,
and the method of difference. I will show that Semmelweis’s data and arguments
align neatly with these methods.8
2.1 The Method of Agreement
Semmelweis worked as a gynecologist and obstetrician in the city of Vienna be-
tween the years 1846 and 1849. Vienna’s maternity hospital had two divisions at
the time. In the first division, childbed fever caused the death of 10% of newly de-
livered mothers on average, but with monthly variation reaching as high as 30% and
as low as 1–2%. The disease’s main symptom was a high fever occurring hours to
days after delivery (hence the name “childbed” fever); the underlying septicaemia,
which caused the fever, frequently led to the patient’s death. In the second division,
childbed fever occurred as well, but at a strikingly lower average rate of little more
than 3%.9 No doubt the existence of two divisions with contrasting mortalities is a
didactic virtue which goes far in explaining the case study’s popularity.
Semmelweis’s scientific achievement was to show that the causal pathway lead-
ing to the higher incidence of childbed fever in the first division was the following:
Doctors and medical students transported some sort of disease-inducing agent from
autopsies, which were performed nearby, to the pregnant women they examined.
The outbreaks of childbed fever were confined to the first division because the
second division only trained midwives, who, unlike doctors, did not perform au-
topsies. Semmelweis initially believed the disease-inducing agent to be cadaverous
matter. Later, he started to think that other types of diseased or decaying substances
8In the interest of brevity and focus, I will only discuss the more prominent applications of Mill’s
methods in Semmelweis’s work, and in particular the methods that are relevant to interpreting the nu-
merical tables in the Etiology. Thus, I am here not discussing Mill’s “joint application of the methods
of agreement and difference”. I am also foregoing a discussion of the “method of residues”, although
a strong case can be made that Semmelweis uses the method – specifically, when he concludes that
there must exist additional causes of childbed fever since the introduction of cadaverous matter can-
not account for all cases (see Semmelweis, 1861, pp. 133–34, or Semmelweis, 1983, p. 93).
9The numbers are from Semmelweis’s first and third tables in the Etiology (Semmelweis, 1861,
p. 3 and 13, or Semmelweis, 1983, p. 64 and 72). Semmelweis was not the first to note the striking
difference in mortality rates between the two divisions: Eduard Lumpe, who had also worked at
the Viennese maternity hospital and who later became one of Semmelweis’s critics, noted in a text
published in 1845 that the mortality in the first division sometimes exceeded that of the second
division by a factor of four or five (Lumpe, 1845, p. 347).
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– such as pus – could also cause the disease. Today, of course, we understand the
bacterial origin of postpartum sepsis. But regardless of the precise nature of the
disease-inducing agent, the institution of hand-washing measures for all doctors
and students succeeded in reducing the incidence of the disease in division 1 to the
same level as observed in division 2.
The typical account of Semmelweis’s discovery begins by enumerating a num-
ber of competing hypotheses concerning the pathogenesis of childbed fever which
were current in the 1840s, and which Semmelweis had to refute. Let us begin
with the notion that childbed fever was caused by some sort of “atmospheric influ-
ence”.10
The atmospheric hypothesis is usually taken to be in obvious contradiction
with “well-established facts” (so writes Hempel, p. 3), and hence easily refuted by
modus tollens: One would expect atmospheric conditions to have equal influence
not only on both divisions of the maternity ward, but also on all parts of the city of
Vienna – but this was clearly not, in fact, the case, and so atmospheric conditions
could be disregarded. This brief summary reflects aspects of Semmelweis’s rea-
soning in his text, but it is incomplete. Semmelweis did not regard this argument
as conclusive, and presumably, his contemporaries would have agreed: It is after all
possible that atmospheric influences are key to the pathogenesis of childbed fever,
but that they only exert their effect under particular local conditions. And indeed
this position was defended in textbooks at the time.11
What the existing literature fails to consider are Semmelweis’s efforts to demon-
strate numerically that atmospheric conditions are not linked to increases or de-
creases in the incidence of childbed fever. For this purpose Semmelweis used
something along the lines of Mill’s “method of agreement”. Let us consider the
method and Semmelweis’s application of it in some detail. Mill defines the method
of agreement as follows:
10Semmelweis uses “atmospheric influences” and “epidemic influences” roughly interchangeably:
“By epidemic influences one understands atmospheric-cosmic-terrestrial changes, as yet not pre-
cisely defined, that often extend over whole countrysides, and by which childbed fever is generated
in persons predisposed by the puerperal state” (Semmelweis, 1861, p. 4, or Semmelweis, 1983, p. 65).
11Note for example that the above mentioned Lumpe (footnote 9, ibid.) discussed the possibility
that childbed fever is caused by a combination of general epidemic and local miasmatic influences.
Far from rejecting epidemic factors as a candidate cause of childbed fever on the grounds that they
would have to affect both divisions of the hospital equally, Lumpe took the different mortalities
between the divisions as proof of the power of local miasmatic influences as causal co-factors. This
reflects the general difficulty of falsifying causal hypotheses, since it is always possible to argue
that the alleged falsifying instance simply lacked some relevant co-factor. For a discussion of this
problem, see Nickelsen and Graßhoff (2011).
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If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all
the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.12
The purpose of Mill’s initially forbidding terminology is epistemic: He needs to
distinguish potential or candidate causes (“circumstances”) and candidate effects
(“phenomena”) from actual, established causes and effects. By “instances” Mill
refers to occurrences (and non-occurrences) of the effect under investigation which
can be individuated in some way, and among which regularities can be ascertained.
Mill offers a more succinct version of the method of agreement two pages later:
The Method of Agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be
eliminated, is not connected with the phenomenon by any law.13
It is this basic notion that Semmelweis applies to the question of atmospheric in-
fluences on the incidence of childbed fever. He writes:
If so-called childbed fever epidemics were really due to atmospheric
influences, then they could not occur in opposing seasons and cli-
mates. In actual fact, however, the disease is observed in all seasons,
in the most different climates, and under all weather conditions.14
In other words, Semmelweis argues that there is no agreement among the atmo-
spheric conditions that predominate during outbreaks of childbed fever. Or to put
it in yet a different way, he argues that time of year “can be eliminated” and is
therefore “not connected with the phenomenon by any law”.
We get an indication of how much weight Semmelweis attached to this argu-
ment from the fact that he devoted a page-long table to it, which is here reprinted
as figure 1.15 For the years from 1841 to 1847, the table shows both the highest and
the lowest mortality rate recorded in any given month – thus, for example, mortal-
ity was lowest for the month of January in the year 1847 at 3.21% and highest in
the year 1842 at 20.84%. Semmelweis concludes:
12Mill (1843), p. 454; III.VIII.§1.
13Mill (1843), p. 456; III.VIII.§3.
14 “Wenn die sogenannten Kindbettfieber-Epidemien wirklich durch atmosphärische Einflüsse be-
dingt wären, so könnten sie nicht in den entgegengesetzten Jahreszeiten und Klimaten vorkommen;
in der Wirklichkeit aber werden zu allen Jahreszeiten, in den verschiedensten Klimaten, unter allen
Arten der Witterungsverhältnisse Kindbettfieber-Epidemien beobachtet” (Semmelweis, 1861, p. 7,
or Semmelweis, 1983, p. 67).
15The table is also found in all editions and translations I am aware of. See for example Carter’s
rearranged version on p. 68.
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This will prove numerically that every month of the year has presented
both favorable and unfavorable states of health of patients in the first
clinic.16
Thus, the method of agreement illuminates the causal reasoning underlying Sem-
melweis’s numerical demonstration centered around his second table.
[Figure 1 around here.]
Mill discusses specific weaknesses of the method of agreement. First, the find-
ing that all instances of a phenomenon P agree in the presence of a certain cir-
cumstance C suggests a causal connection, but not a specific causal structure. As
Mill stresses in his definition (here quoted on page 6), the arrow of causation may
point in the opposite direction: P may well be a cause of C. Or alternatively (if we
allow for the existence of circumstances of which we are ignorant), P and C may
be causally linked only indirectly through a common cause. Thus, the method of
agreement does not permit us to establish the direction of causality, or to distin-
guish direct causation from epiphenomenal linkage.
Second, the method of agreement is unreliable in even minimally complex
causal structures which include alternative causes.17 If we assume that a phe-
nomenon P is caused by either A or B, then the method of agreement would force
us to conclude that neither A nor B is a cause (or effect) of the phenomenon, since
A-caused and B-caused instances of P need have neither A nor B in common. Or
in other words, we may exclude A and still observe P, since it can also be caused by
B, and conversely. So if we assume that there are multiple constellations of causal
factors that can produce childbed fever, then the method of agreement may lead us
astray.
Mill writes that only the method of difference allows secure inferences. But
this does not diminish the method of agreement’s value:
16 “Es wird dadurch mittelst Zahlen bewiesen, dass jeder Monat im Jahre einen günstigen und
jeder Monat im Jahre einen ungünstigen Gesundheitszustand der Wöchnerinnen an der ersten Klinik
dargeboten hat” (Semmelweis, 1861, p. 7). The translation is mine, from Semmelweis’s original.
Although I generally tried to adhere to Carter’s translation (Semmelweis, 1983, p. 67), in this case
multiple imprecisions needed to be adressed. In Carter’s translation, Semmelweis is supposed to say
that “every month of the year can be either favorable or unfavorable for the health of patients”, which
implies a causal role for the time of year, although a variable one. But the verb Semmelweis uses
is “darbieten”, or “to present”: Every month has presented both favorable and unfavorable statistics,
and thus, on the method of agreement, we may exclude time of year as a potential cause. A causal
connection is just what Semmelweis is denying. Moreover, Carter omitted the adverb “numerically”,
which wrongly deemphasizes Semmelweis’s quantitative mindset.
17Mill (1843), p. 507; III.X.§2.
8
The Method of Agreement is chiefly to be resorted to, as a means of
suggesting applications of the Method of Difference [. . . ] or as an
inferior resource, in case the Method of Difference is impracticable;
which, as we before showed, generally arises from the impossibility
of artificially producing the phenomena.18
Thus, despite the method of agreement’s limitations, the method has heuristic value
(as a guide for the application of the method of difference) and may serve as a
limited tool (where the more robust method of difference is not applicable).
Before I turn to the method of difference, I will discuss how Semmelweis tested
another competing hypothesis using the method of concomitant variation. This is
by far the least understood part of Semmelweis’s famous Etiology.
2.2 The Method of Concomitant Variation
Semmelweis’s extensive use of numerical tables is a conspicuous feature of the
Etiology. Curiously, many or even most of the tables are missing in some of the
most widely available editions of the work. In general, editors and translators have
taken the omitted tables to be redundant. For example, Paul Zweifel noted in the
preface to a widely available German-language edition from 1912 that he had left
out “statistical tables, which are for the most part unnecessary”.19 Similarly, K.
Codell Carter omitted ten tables from Semmelweis’s main discussion in his widely
used English translation (published in 1983) by noting that “Semmelweis gives
eighteen pages of further tables presenting this information in different arrange-
ments”.20 While Carter is less dismissive than Zweifel, he also suggests that the
tables are redundant. Already in 1964 Erna Lesky was dismayed that commentators
had “at most expressed irritation at the abundance of [Semmelweis’s] comparative
tables of mortality and morbidity” without asking how Semmelweis came to em-
ploy such statistical methods.21 As mentioned above, I will not pursue the question
of Semmelweis’s intellectual influences. But Lesky is right to draw our attention
to Semmelweis’s neglected tables.22
18Mill (1843), p. 459-460; III.VIII.§3.
19“Sein grundlegendes Werk, das hier zum Abdruck kommt, allerdings mit einigen Kürzungen,
nämlich unter Weglassen von statistischen Tabellen, die für die Hauptsache entbehrlich sind, erschien
erst im Jahr 1861” (Zweifel, 1912, p. 4).
20Semmelweis (1983), p. 70.
21Lesky (1964), p. 60.
22While the tables have not received the methodological analysis they deserve, they are intact in
some important editions of the Etiology. See for example Semmelweis’s collected works by Tiberius
von Gyo˝ry (1905) and the first English translation by Frank P. Murphy (Semmelweis, 1941).
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My thesis is that many of Semmelweis’s tables only make sense if they are read
in the context of causal reasoning strategies. On this view, it is no surprise that the
tables have been misunderstood as redundant or as mere rearrangements of data,
since the causal reasoning strategies underlying them have also gone unappreci-
ated.
We have already seen that Semmelweis’s second table can be understood as
an application of Mill’s method of agreement. In the present section I will dis-
cuss Semmelweis’s tables four to thirteen, which were omitted by both Carter and
Zweifel. All of these tables are best understood as applications of something like
Mill’s method of concomitant variation. Mill defines the method as follows:
Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phe-
nomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an ef-
fect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of
causation.23
Semmelweis used the method of concomitant variation to test the hypothesis that
overcrowding in the hospital wards is a cause of childbed fever. Again there exists
a “shorthand” version that one finds in later accounts of Semmelweis’s discovery:
It is claimed that the second division was, if anything, more crowded than the
first – and so another competing hypothesis was delivered a quick death by modus
tollens. Again the claim is historically accurate: Semmelweis does point out that
the first division had become notorious for its high mortality rate, so that patients
maneuvered to be admitted to the second division, which consequently experienced
more crowding.24
Again, however, Semmelweis’s extended discussion is more sophisticated and
quantitative, and it relies less than is commonly thought on comparisons with the
second division. Over the span of ten tables, Semmelweis argues that crowding
and mortality rate in the first division do not vary concomitantly. I suggest that we
should take seriously the amount of space and typographical effort that Semmel-
weis invests in an argument: He would presumably not have devoted a table, let
alone ten, to supporting an argument that he did not consider to be a pivotal one.
However, the abundance of tables is not matched by an abundance of explanatory
comments, so that the significance of Semmelweis’s numbers is not immediately
obvious from reading the text. This may explain in part why Semmelweis’s editors
generally chose to omit the tables.
23Mill (1843), p. 470; III.VIII.§6.
24Semmelweis (1861), p. 11, or Semmelweis (1983), pp. 69–70.
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The argument begins with the third table. Since no records of crowding were
kept, Semmelweis uses the number of births in a given month as a proxy indicator.
The table shows the number of births, the number of deaths, and (calculated from
the first two) the relative mortality for every month from January 1841 to May
1847 (the point at which Semmelweis instituted his hand-washing measures, to be
discussed below).25 Carter is correct in pointing out that the next ten tables are rear-
rangements of the data in the third table – but this view misses the methodological
point.
In table four (see figure 2), Semmelweis uses January 1846 as the baseline,
since it is the month with the greatest overall number of births (336 in total) and
hence the greatest crowding. He then adds 13 months in which the total number of
deaths remains above the baseline as the total number of births (and thus crowding)
decreases from the maximum of 336 to as low as 209.
[Figure 2 around here.]
The fifth table (here not printed) continues the same argument by taking into
consideration a further 11 months in which absolute mortality was below the Jan-
uary 1846 baseline of 45 deaths, but relative mortality was above the baseline of
13.39%. Semmelweis tabulates a total of 24 months out of 76 in which crowding
was lower but relative mortality was higher than during the month of maximum
crowding. Thus, Semmelweis demonstrates that crowding and mortality do not
vary concomitantly.
It is difficult from a modern vantage point to understand why Semmelweis did
not present this information in the form of a graph, which would have made the
underlying methodology much easier to grasp. Figure 3 is my own graphical rep-
resentation of Semmelweis’s data: It is easy to see – almost at a glance – that
crowding and mortality do not vary concomitantly. Historians of the development
of graphical methods regard the early 19th century as a time of innovation in which
many graphical forms of representation were invented or improved (this includes
bar charts, pie charts and histograms).26 The second half of the 19th century is
considered a golden age during which enthusiastic use was made of the new graph-
ical methods. However, the widespread adoption of graphical methods was not
immediate. According to Funkhouser (1937, p. 292), even the question of whether
numerical tables were preferable to verbal descriptions was disputed well into the
25This table is omitted by Zweifel (1912), but included in Semmelweis (1983) on p. 72. See the
tables on p. 13 and following in Semmelweis (1861).
26See especially Funkhouser (1937) and Friendly (2008).
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19th century, and so it may not surprise that graphical representations were seen as
even more problematic. Especially in England, statistical publications in the first
half of the 19th century for the most part took tabular form (p. 293). Funkhouser
quotes French and German commentators who, throughout the first half of the 19th
century, expressed the opinion that graphs were mere playthings (p. 295). Friendly
(2008, p. 13) notes that English statisticians were more inclined towards tables
until as late as 1870. Thus, while we lack a detailed history of the adoption of
graphical methods by discipline and geographic region, the histories we do have
suggest that it was not unusual for Semmelweis to present statistical information in
tabular rather than graphical form. Moreover, my own analysis of the data in fig-
ure 3 is helped enormously by the use of linear regression, which suggests that the
highly variable data series in the lower panel does not include a downward trend.
However, linear regression was not available to Semmelweis. He may thus have
concluded that merely plotting the data would not help him make his case.
[Figure 3 around here.]
What is the purpose of the remaining omitted tables? In tables six to ten, Sem-
melweis proceeds to consider a complex causal situation. The time of year and
crowding may be interacting causal factors: For example, crowding may have a
significant impact on childbed fever during the winter months. Semmelweis tries
to tease these variables apart by considering each month separately (as an exam-
ple, see figure 4). Printing just a subset of the data in table six, he notes that in the
months of March and April the highest absolute number of births and the highest
absolute number of deaths do in fact occur together (in the years 1846 and 1847,
respectively). However, when relative mortalities are considered in table seven,
Semmelweis notes that for any given month, the greatest relative mortality never
occurred in the same month as the greatest number of births.
[Figure 4 around here.]
Tables eight, nine and ten are in the service of the same argument. But whereas
tables six and seven only considered a subset of the 76 months for which Semmel-
weis has data, tables eight to ten tabulate all 76 months. Within each month, the
years are arranged by number of births in table eight, by number of deaths in table
nine, and by relative mortality in table ten. In his all-too-brief introductions for
these tables, Semmelweis quite explicitly invokes a notion akin to concomitance of
variation:
If, however, we arrange the individual months according to the number
of births occurring in them, that is, according to the degree of crowd-
12
ing, then a gradual decrease in the number of births, that is, in the de-
gree of crowding, is not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in
mortality [. . . ]. If, however, we arrange the individual months accord-
ing to absolute mortality, we see no corresponding gradual decrease
in the number of births, that is, no corresponding gradual decrease in
crowding [. . . ] If, however, we arrange the individual months accord-
ing to relative mortality, we see no corresponding gradual decrease in
the number of births, that is, no gradual decrease in crowding.27
Thus, not only is Semmelweis here using the method of concomitant variation, he
is also considering complex causal structures in a way that the modern literature
on Semmelweis neglects to discuss.
Semmelweis then proceeds to the most straightforward application of the method
of concomitant variation discussed so far. He arranges all 76 months according to
the number of births (table eleven), the number of deaths (table twelve), and rel-
ative mortality (table thirteen). For each table, he notes (as above) that there is
no concomitant variation between the variable according to which the table is ar-
ranged and the two remaining variables. See figure 5, which shows an excerpt from
Semmelweis’s eleventh table.
[Figure 5 around here.]
Again Mill discusses strengths and weaknesses of the method. The method of
concomitant variation, much like the method of agreement, can suggest a causal
relationship, but it cannot determine the direction of the causal arrow or exclude
the possibility of a common cause. Nevertheless, like the method of agreement,
the method of concomitant variation has considerable value. First, it can guide us
to causal relationships that we may wish to investigate further by the method of
difference. Second, in cases where we may not be able to apply the method of
difference, the method of concomitant variation may be among our next best tools.
Third, Mill particularly stresses cases where we cannot eliminate a variable entirely
(for example, temperature) to test its causal relevance – but we may still observe its
27 “Wenn wir aber die einzelnen Monate nach der Anzahl der in derselben vorkommenden Ge-
burten, d.h. nach den Graden der vorhandenen Ueberfüllung, aneinanderreihen, so zeigt sich bei der
allmäligen Abnahme der Geburten, d.h. der allmäligen Abnahme der Ueberfüllung, keine entspre-
chende Abnahme in der Sterblichkeit [. . . ]. Wenn wir aber die einzelnen Monate nach der absoluten
Sterblichkeit aneinanderreihen, so zeigt sich keine dem entsprechende allmälige Abnahme der Ge-
burten, also Abnahme der Ueberfüllung [. . . ] Wenn wir aber die einzelnen Monate nach der relativen
Sterblichkeit aneinanderreihen, so zeigt sich der allmäligen Abnahme der relativen Sterblichkeit kei-
ne allmälig entsprechende Abnahme in der Anzahl der vorgekommenen Geburten, oder keine allmä-
lige Abnahme der Ueberfüllung [. . . ]” (Semmelweis, 1861, pp. 18–26). The translation is my own,
since the relevant section was omitted from Carter’s translation.
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magnitudes to co-vary (with or without intervention) with another variable. Finally,
after successfully demonstrating a causal relationship between variables C and E
by the method of difference, we may profitably employ the method of concomitant
variation to establish the precise quantitative relationship between the variables.
The causal inferences sanctioned by the method of concomitant variation are
more limited if – as in this case – we find an absence of concomitance. Mill writes
that “it is for the most part true that a modification of the cause is followed by a
modification of the effect”, but that this may not always be the case.28 A plausible
causal structure to illustrate this is one where a threshold effect operates: An effect
may occur when a cause of a certain magnitude is present, but the effect may
then remain unchanged as the magnitude of the cause increases further. Hence,
while concomitance of variation suggests causality, the absence of concomitance
does not give equally strong evidence of the absence of causality.29 It appears that
Semmelweis did not make this careful distinction.30
In summary, Semmelweis argues against the notion that overcrowding is to
blame for childbed fever by demonstrating that changes in crowding are not ac-
companied by changes in mortality, and vice versa. The underlying logic is Mill’s
method of concomitant variation. This explains why Semmelweis included so
many tables in his work, and their apparent redundancy vanishes (or is at least
seriously reduced) once we understand the underlying causal reasoning strategies.
2.3 The Method of Difference
As we have seen, both the method of agreement and the method of concomitant
variation help to make sense of many of Semmelweis’s arguments, especially of
his neglected numerical tables. However, from the point of view of justification,
both methods are clearly defeasible, and we have seen that Mill judged the method
of agreement to be an “inferior resource” to the method of difference.31 Let us then
turn to the method of difference, which Mill believed to be uniquely reliable:
It [. . . ] appears to be by the Method of Difference alone that we can
ever, in the way of direct experience, arrive with certainty at causes.32
28Mill (1843), p. 472; III.VIII.§6.
29I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point.
30See Semmelweis (1861), p. 12.
31See the quotation from Mill on p. 8.
32Mill (1843), p. 459; III.VIII.§3.
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The method of difference is similar to the method of agreement, but it imposes
much more stringent criteria on the kinds of instances we are to compare:
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance
save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the cir-
cumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or
cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.33
The method of difference captures a basic notion underlying at least one flavor
of robust scientific methodology: Vary only one factor at a time to determine its
causal role.
It hardly needs saying that much work is required to flesh out this intuition
if it is supposed to do any real work. In particular, an account needs to be given
of why we should ever judge two instances to differ in only one circumstance.
(Mill suggests that the fact of artificial intervention provides such a reason.34) For
now, however, I will focus only on the historical evidence which suggests that
Semmelweis made conscious use of something like the method of difference, and
that he did so in full awareness of the method’s logic and force.
It is easy enough to retell Semmelweis’s key clinical intervention as an applica-
tion of the method of difference. Semmelweis had the suspicion that the reason for
the high incidence of childbed fever in the first division was that doctors and med-
ical students transported cadaverous matter from autopsies to the pregnant women
they examined, and that the cadaverous matter in some way caused the disease.
He mandated a hand-washing regime for those performing autopsies, and thereby
achieved a striking reduction in the incidence of the disease. So in effect, Sem-
melweis had created two groups for (longitudinal) comparison: an “experimental”
group (all the patients who were exposed to the cadaverous matter from autopsies)
and a “control” group (all the patients who were not exposed to the cadaverous mat-
ter but otherwise treated the same). Since the disease occurred in the experimental
group but not in the longitudinal control group, the causal role of cadaverous matter
was established according to the method of difference.
Having retold Semmelweis’s key inference in this mold, it is only right to note
that mere plausibility does not offer strong reasons for preferring one methodolog-
ical reconstruction over another: What specific reasons do we have for believing
33Mill (1843), p. 455; III.VIII.§2.
34Mill (1843), p. 457; III.VIII.§3.
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that Semmelweis actually thought in terms of the method of difference? There are
two pieces of evidence to consider.
First, Semmelweis’s own description of his methodology is quite specific:
I assumed that the cause of the greater mortality rate was cadaverous
particles adhering to the hands of examining obstetricians. I removed
this cause by chlorine washings. Consequently, mortality in the first
clinic fell below that of the second. I therefore concluded that cadav-
erous matter adhering to the hands of the physicians was, in reality,
the cause of the increased mortality rate in the first clinic.35
This may not yet suffice to show that Semmelweis is conscious of the conceptual
background of the method he is using. After all, he does not describe a general
methodology in the abstract, but argues in terms of the concrete problem at hand.
However, in the very next paragraph, Semmelweis goes on to assure the reader
that, just as Mill’s method requires it, the instances he is comparing have “every
circumstance save one in common”:
Since the chlorine washings were instituted with such dramatic suc-
cess, not even the smallest additional changes in the procedures of the
first clinic were adopted to which the decline in mortality could be
even partially attributed.36
This is the second piece of evidence that strongly supports the view that Semmel-
weis did indeed think about his methodology in terms of varying one factor while
alternative causes are controlled, so as to demonstrate the test factor’s causal role.
In the Etiology, much of the weight of the argument is again carried by numerical
tables, which underpin the claim that the mortality rates between the two longitu-
dinally compared groups differed as claimed.37
35“Ich habe vorausgesetzt, dass die an der untersuchenden Hand des Geburtshelfers klebenden
Cadavertheile die Ursache der grösseren Sterblichkeit an der ersten Gebärklinik sei; ich habe diese
Ursache durch die Einführung der Chlorwaschungen entfernt. Der Erfolg war, dass die Sterblichkeit
an der ersten Gebärklinik in die Grenzen eingeengt wurde, innerhalb welcher sie auch an der zwei-
ten vorgekommen ist, wie die oben angeführten Zahlen zeigen. Es ist also der Schluss, dass die an
der Hand klebenden Cadavertheile in Wirklichkeit das Plus der Sterblichkeit an der ersten Gebärkli-
nik hervorgebracht haben, auch ein berechtigter” (Semmelweis, 1861, p. 58, or Semmelweis, 1983,
p. 92).
36“Seit die Chlorwaschungen mit so auffallend günstigem Erfolge in Gebrauch gezogen wurden,
wurde nicht die geringste Veränderung in den Verhältnissen der ersten Gebärklinik vorgenommen,
welcher man einen Antheil an der Verminderung der Sterblichkeit zuschreiben könnte” (Semmel-
weis, 1861, p. 58, or Semmelweis, 1983, p. 92).
37See table 15 and following in Semmelweis (1861), including one unlabeled table on p. 56, and
tables 5 to 8 in Semmelweis (1983).
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3 From causal to mechanistic knowledge
The arguments of the preceding section strongly suggest that Mill’s methods pro-
vide an adequate description of many or most of Semmelweis’s inferences. How-
ever, it may be objected that Mill’s methods leave us short of our inferential ambi-
tions. For depending on how precisely we construe Semmelweis’s application of
the method of difference, his results are either not as informative, or else not as
well founded, as is commonly assumed.
If we take Semmelweis merely to demonstrate that hand-washing is an effective
means by which to reduce the incidence of childbed fever, then his results are reli-
able to the extent that the method of difference is reliable: Semmelweis intervened
on the relevant causal variable (hand-washing) and observed the relevant effect (a
reduction in the incidence of childbed fever), and he took care to establish that no
alternative causal pathway was operative to confound his results. Thus, the method
of difference establishes the causal role of hand-washing quite securely. But this is
something less than the discovery concerning the causal role of cadaverous matter
for which we celebrate Semmelweis, and which he himself believed to have made.
On this interpretation, then, Semmelweis’s findings are reliable, but in theoretical
terms not very substantive.
On the other hand, if we take Semmelweis to have shown that cadaverous mat-
ter is the cause of childbed fever, the situation is reversed: We get a substantive
result at the price of reliability. To see why this is so, let us assume for argu-
ment’s sake that the chlorinated lime solution cures childbed fever, even if it is ap-
plied only in small quantities. Semmelweis’s experimental results would still hold:
Hand-washing would reduce the incidence of the disease. But the removal of ca-
daverous matter from the hands of the physicians would be a mere epiphenomenon
of the true causal pathway, which involves the transfer of curative chlorinated lime
solution from physicians to patients.
We must conclude that Semmelweis’s results do not speak directly to the causal
role of cadaverous matter: His results concerning the effectiveness of hand-washing
are solid, but the details of his pathophysiological hypothesis are underdetermined.
Peter Lipton regarded this as a general problem for Mill’s methods.38 We may
accept that Mill’s method of difference licenses the inference from observed differ-
ences to causal roles (given a deterministic system, the exclusion of confounders,
and so on). But oftentimes we are not inferring the causal role of an observed dif-
38See Lipton (2004), pp. 126–128.
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ference, but of a difference which is itself only inferred. In Semmelweis’s time,
the absence or presence of cadaverous matter adhering to the hands of physicians
was unobservable, and hence it constituted such an inferred difference. This seems
to block the straightforward application of the method of difference to the question
of whether cadaverous matter causes childbed fever. Lipton argues that there is a
reason why we nevertheless believe that Semmelweis’s clinical intervention con-
firmed his pathophysiological hypothesis: The unobserved difference (cadaverous
matter adhering or not adhering to the hands of physicians) would be a good expla-
nation of the observed difference (high or low mortality from childbed fever) if it
did exist. Thus, to make Mill’s methods do any real work, Lipton argues, we need
to supplement them with explanatory considerations.39
However, close consideration of the historical sources again suggests that the
philosophical debate has neglected, to its detriment, historical facts.
First, it is not strictly true that cadaverous matter was unobservable to Semmel-
weis. He noted repeatedly that the sense of smell allowed him to determine whether
chlorine washings had been effective.40 In other words, the sense of smell provided
Semmelweis with a diagnostic criterion for the presence or absence of cadaverous
matter. He also noted that the quantities of cadaverous matter that were relevant to
his investigation were so minuscule that only the sense of smell could be used to
diagnose their presence.41 Thus, despite the fact that the cadaverous matter is not
observable to human eyes, Semmelweis had some causal access to it. This does not
solve the underdetermination problem I introduced above, but it speaks against the
notion that Semmelweis was relying on an unobservable difference which was in-
ferred only on explanatory grounds. Given more reliable diagnostic criteria, Mill’s
method of difference could in principle be applied rigorously to the problem.
Second, and more importantly, Semmelweis’s investigations did not stop with
his clinical intervention. Philosophers of science have tried to explain why Sem-
melweis’s clinical results speak directly to the truth of his pathophysiological hy-
pothesis. This is where reconstructions of Semmelweis’s work in terms of the
hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, or in terms of inference to the best
explanation, seem most attractive. In Semmelweis’s own argument, however, the
gap between clinical results and pathophysiological hypothesis is bridged by ani-
mal experiments.
39Alexander Bird makes a similar argument, see Bird (2010), p. 351.
40See for instance Semmelweis (1861), p. 54; the same is noted by one of Semmelweis’s corre-
spondents on p. 287. See also Semmelweis (1983), p. 88 and p. 177.
41Semmelweis (1861), p. 339; the passage is not included in Carter’s translation.
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Semmelweis writes that he performed animal experiments in order “to con-
firm my views directly”.42 His choice of words – the distinction between direct
and indirect support – is appropriate. The success of the clinical intervention cer-
tainly served to make Semmelweis’s pathophysiological hypothesis plausible, but
this is only indirect support for the reasons outlined above. The open question
was whether cadaverous matter is in fact capable of entering the organism’s blood
stream from the uterus, and whether it can induce pyemia such as is observed in
childbed fever. Finding a direct answer to this question is the goal of Semmelweis’s
animal experiments.
The experiments are presented in the Etiology on pp. 76–80, but they were
also part of one of the earliest published accounts of Semmelweis’s findings.43
Semmelweis reports a total of nine animal experiments in which the uteri of rabbits
were treated with various fluids such as exudate from endometritis or pus from
abscesses. The animals died after developing pathological changes which closely
mirrored those of puerperal fever.44
There is every reason to think that Semmelweis’s experiments were not con-
ducted particularly carefully. Unlike the clinical investigation, the animal exper-
iments seem haphazard. Semmelweis experimented on only a small number of
animals, and he changed his methodology several times. For instance, he began
by introducing substances into the uteri of rabbits by brush, but then switched to
syringes so as to avoid damaging the uterine tissue. He also used a variety of
substances such as pus and exudate unsystematically. As far as we know, no con-
trol experiments were performed. Moreover, Semmelweis’s pathophysiological
hypothesis assumed that minuscule amounts of cadaverous matter were transmit-
ted from physicians to patients, but in the animal experiments large amounts of
deleterious substances were inserted into the animals’ uteri. Semmelweis’s oppo-
nent Friedrich Wilhelm Scanzoni thought it was a trivial finding that such crude
interventions will cause pyemia in animals.45 This is certainly a reasonable objec-
tion. I do not wish to claim that Semmelweis’s animal experiments were decisive
– they were not, and reasonable people could doubt Semmelweis’s pathophysio-
42“Um meine Ansichten einer direkten Prüfung zu unterziehen, hielt ich Versuche an Thieren für
nöthig [. . . ].” See p. 76 in Semmelweis (1861) and p. 105 in Semmelweis (1983).
43See Joseph Skoda’s paper in von Gyo˝ry (1905), pp. 36–45.
44Semmelweis (1861), p. 80.
45Scanzoni’s remarks are in Vierteljahrschrift für die praktische Heilkunde, Vol. 7(2), 1850, in
the section Literarischer Anzeiger, p. 25–33. Semmelweis (1861) discusses Scanzoni at length,
beginning on p. 315.
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logical hypothesis. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the animal experiments were
intended to close a gap in what could be learned from clinical experiments alone.46
The line of evidence concerned with animal experiments is usefully considered
mechanistic in the sense of the past decade’s literature on that subject. It is not nec-
essary to commit to any particular flavor of the mechanistic approach.47 All of them
understand mechanisms roughly as “entities” (Machamer, Darden and Craver) or
“component parts” (Bechtel) which interact in well defined ways. We have a mech-
anistic explanation of a phenomenon if we can show how it was brought about by
accepted entities and accepted interactions which are organized in a continuous
chain. In Semmelweis’s animal experiments, questions of a mechanistic nature
took center stage – for instance, the question of whether the uteri of healthy preg-
nant women even have abrasions through which cadaverous matter could enter the
blood stream. This is why Semmelweis stopped using a brush, whose hairs might
cause wounds, and started using a syringe to introduce substances into the animals’
uteri: The mechanism had to operate in the absence of experimenter-induced uter-
ine wounds. Nevertheless, Semmelweis’s opponents remained doubtful that the
necessary path of entry from the uterus into the blood stream existed in otherwise
healthy patients.48 Special emphasis was further placed on whether a particular
type of interaction existed: cadaverous matter causing pyemia. These are exactly
the mechanistic questions left unanswered if the clinical data is considered in iso-
lation.49
At least one of Semmelweis’s contemporaries believed the animal experiments
to be the clinching piece of evidence. Joseph Skoda, in one of the first public
46The clinical information offered some limited support for the pathophysiological hypothesis:
In 1847, Semmelweis’s colleague Kolletschka cut himself during a dissection, experienced simi-
lar symptoms as women who died from chlidbed fever (which we would now recognize as sepsis)
and died. Semmelweis claimed that Kolletschka’s death was an important clue to the cadaverous-
matter-hypothesis (Semmelweis, 1861, p. 52 and Semmelweis, 1983, p. 87–88). I am grateful to an
anonymous referee for emphasizing this link between the clinical data and the pathophysiological
hypothesis.
47See Glennan (1996), Machamer et al. (2000) and Bechtel (2006).
48See Bernard Seyfert’s arguments against Semmelweis immediately following those of Scanzoni,
cited in footnote 45, p. 34–36.
49Russo and Williamson (2007), p. 163, argue that the mechanistic question could only be an-
swered with the advent of the germ theory of disease. I think this is overly pessimistic: Whether a
particular causal process constitutes a proper mechanism will depend on the accepted bottoming-out
activities (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 13–14). Today, a full mechanistic explanation of childbed fever
would ask for detailed information about how particular bacteria enter the organism and activate
the immune system, down to interactions between cell-surface receptors. In 1850, the fact that “ca-
daverous matter” can induce pyemia – if established well – might have been a perfectly acceptable
bottoming-out activity.
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communications of Semmelweis’s findings in 1849, suggests a long list of further
statistical data that could be obtained to test Semmelweis’s claims – for example,
statistics over longer periods of time and from other hospitals. But of the animal
experiments Skoda says:
If they succeeded, the solution of the other tasks was of lesser impor-
tance.50
Skoda’s view that the animal experiments can clinch the matter makes sense if we
understand their role in fleshing out the pathophysiological mechanism underlying
the clinical data.
Like the numerical tables discussed above, the experiments were given short
shrift by many authors. Hempel and Lipton do not mention them at all; and in
Carter’s translation, the experiments are omitted save for a summary (p. 105). The
omission of the animal experiments has made it impossible to appreciate the full
evidential force of Semmelweis’s arguments: Clinical data and animal experiments
are complementary, the former proving the effectiveness of the hand-washing in-
tervention, the latter supporting the pathophysiological mechanism.
4 Conclusions
I have argued that there exists a largely untold methodological story behind Sem-
melweis’s abundant numerical tables. The tables were omitted from widely avail-
able editions of the Etiology, and philosophers of science have mostly ignored
them. A reconstruction of the tables in terms of Mill’s methods of causal inference
forms the basis of my account of Semmelweis’s clinical investigations.
Moreover, I have argued that methodological reconstructions of Semmelweis’s
work have generally tried to establish too much on the basis of clinical findings
alone. Upon closer consideration, the empirical support for Semmelweis’s pro-
posed pathophysiological mechanism rests in large part on his likewise neglected
animal experiments.
The present paper is mainly an argument for the descriptive adequacy of a re-
construction of Semmelweis’s work in terms of causal reasoning and mechanisms.
It remains for a subsequent paper to compare and contrast the philosophical virtues
of the various accounts of Semmelweis’s work.
50“Wenn diese gelangen, war die Lösung der übrigen Aufgaben von geringerer Bedeutung” (von
Gyo˝ry, 1905, p. 42).
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Figures
Figure 1. Semmelweis’s second table. It shows that extremes of high and low mortality from childbed
fever occur in every month of the year, which leads Semmelweis to exclude the time of year as a
cause of childbed fever. This may be understood as an application of Mill’s method of agreement, as
explained in the text. (All tables are from the digitized copy of Semmelweis (1861) in the Staatsbib-
liothek zu Berlin. Accessed through Deutsches Textarchiv, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 2011.)
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Figure 2. Semmelweis’s fourth table, which was omitted from some of the most widely available edi-
tions of the Etiology. Semmelweis is arguing that crowding and mortality do not vary concomitantly.
First column: month; second column: year; third column: number of births; fourth column: absolute
mortality; fifth column: relative mortality; sixth column: difference in number of births relative to
baseline (January 1846); seventh column: difference in number of deaths relative to baseline. Note
especially columns six and seven: As the number of births decreases, the number of deaths merely
fluctuates. In other words, no concomitant variation is observed.
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Figure 3. A graphical representation of Semmelweis’s application of the method of concomitant
variation to investigate the relationship between crowding and mortality. Top panel: Semmelweis’s
76 months (from his third table) are ordered by decreasing number of births, which is taken as a
proxy for decreasing crowding. Bottom panel: Relative mortality does not vary concomitantly with
decreasing crowding, but instead merely fluctuates around the average relative mortality of 10%.
Lacking a graphical means of representation, Semmelweis tried to convey the same result in tabular
form.
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Figure 4. Semmelweis’s tenth table. Semmelweis is considering the possibility that crowding may
influence childbed fever only during certain months of the year. He therefore analyzes his data by
months, here arranging the years for each month by decreasing relative mortality. See text for details.
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Figure 5. Semmelweis’s eleventh table. The table is arranged by decreasing number of births. Mor-
tality does not vary concomitantly, but fluctuates. This is the second page of the table.
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